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Judges and Social Media:
Disclosure as Disinfectant
Benjamin P. Cooper*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After Pennsylvania District Judge Thomas Placey continued a preliminary hearing for a defendant facing criminal charges arising out of a standoff
with the police, some observers were unhappy.' They took to the Internet and
quickly found Judge Placey's Facebook page, which showed that defendant
Barry Horn, Jr. was among Judge Placey's hundreds of Facebook "friends."2
Judge Placey said that he was only acquainted with Horn because he knew
Horn's father, but he stated that he had never socialized with the defendant
and did not consider him a real friend.3 Judge Placey also told the media that
he accepts every "friend" request he receives.4 After the case received media
attention, Judge Placey recused himself though he never explained why.5
In another Pennsylvania case, Municipal Judge Charles Hayden declined to recuse himself in a drunken driving case against State Representative Cherelle Parker, who was one of Judge Hayden's 1,316 Facebook
friends.6 Judge Hayden claimed that he did not know Representative Parker
apart from their Facebook accounts; Parker's attorney, Joseph Kelly, stated
that Facebook friendships "do not necessarily present a potential conflict of
interest."7 After Judge Hayden suppressed evidence in the case, the Attorney
*

I.

2.

Jessie D. Puckett, Jr. Lecturer and Associate Professor of Law, University of
Mississippi School of Law. I would like to thank the members of my faculty
writing group (Jack Nowlin, Stephanie Showalter Otts, and Michael Dodge) for
their helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Keith Swisher for advising me on
sources. Thank you to John Browning and the editors of the SMU Science and
Technology Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Social Media Law
Symposium and for putting together a fabulous conference.
Sara Ganim, Cumberland County Judge Thomas A. Placey underfire for having too many Facebook friends, THE PATRIOT NEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://
www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/09/judges-facebookfriend-has-s
om.htmi.
Id.

3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id.
Dan Miller, Cumberland County DistrictJudge Thomas Placey Recuses Himselffrom Case Over Facebook Flap, THE PATRIOT NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), http:/
/www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/10/districtjudge-tom-placey_
recu.html.

6.

Aaron Moselle, Judge Refuses to Recuse Himselffrom ParkerDUI Case, State
Plans an Appeal, NEWSWORKS (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.newsworks.org/
index.php?option=comflexicontent&view=items&id=30248:hayden-denialstory-.
Id.

7.
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General's Office appealed,8 arguing that Judge Hayden should have recused
himself based on his Facebook connection with the defendant.9 The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas reversed the decision and held that Judge Hayden's Facebook friendship with the defendant required recusal.10
The judges' conduct in these cases raises many important issues.
Among them:
Should judges participate in social media at all?
Should Judge Placey and Judge Hayden have recused themselves based
on their social media connections with the defendants?
Should the judges have disclosed these social media connections?
In a previous article, I reviewed the relevant ethics opinions issued to
date" and began to address these issues.12 All of the ethics opinions endorse
judges using social media, albeit in a "judicious" way.' 3 As the opinion from
the American Bar Association concluded, such use "can benefit judges in
both their personal and professional lives" and also keep them from being
"thought of as isolated or out of touch."' 14 But on the question of whether
judges should be able to friend lawyers who appear before them, the ethics
8.

Brian M. Jones, Legal Ethics and Your Facebook Friends Friend, Foe Both or

Neither?, 35 PA. LAW. 40, 42 (Mar./Apr. 2013) (Interestingly, the Pennsylvania
Attorney General's Office was handling the case because the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office had recused itself because the district attorney was
friends (and a Facebook friend) with Representative Parker).
9.

Id.

10. Id. at 42-43.
11. See Social Media and the Courts Network, NAT'L.

CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://
www.ncsc.org/Topics/Media/Social-Media-and-the-Courts/StateLinks.aspx?
cat=judicial%20Ethics%20Advisory%200pinions%20on%2OSocial%20Media

(last visited Mar. 13, 2015) (The ABA, California, Ohio, New York, Florida,
Connecticut, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Kentucky, South Carolina, Washington, and Maryland have all issued opinions addressing judges' use of social
12.

13.

media).
Benjamin P. Cooper, Judges and Social Media: "Friends" with Costs and Benefits The Professional Lawyer, 22 A.B.A. CENTER FOR PROF RESP., no. 3
(2014).

Id. (Unique ethical traps await judges who use social media. Among them:
judges should not comment on pending cases on social media; judges should

not engage in ex parte communications on social media; judges should not
engage in independent investigations on social media; judges should be discreet
in what they say on social media in order to avoid expressions of bias or

prejudice; judges should monitor comments on their social media pages; and
judges should be careful what they "like" on social media).

14.

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 1, 4 (2013);
see also John G. Browning, Why Can't We Be Friends? Judges' Use of Social
Media, 68 U. MIAMi L. REV. 487, 505 (discussing positive uses that judges

have made of social media).
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opinions are divided.'5 I argued that judges should be free to "friend" anybody-and that a social media connection alone should not disqualify the
judgel6-provided that if judges are connected with lawyers, litigants, or witnesses in the case, those "friendships" should be fully disclosed to the
parties. 17
This article expands on the tentative thoughts that I previously offered
on judges' obligations to disclose social media connections and argues in
favor of a bright line rule that judges should disclose all social media connections with lawyers, litigants, and witnesses. Very little authority addresses the
disclosure issue in generall8 or the disclosure of social media connections
specifically.19

A broad disclosure regime would serve two primary purposes. First, a
broad disclosure rule would best serve the primary policy behind disclosure:
maintaining the litigants' and the public's confidence in the judiciary. Second, it would provide much needed clarity to judges who have been seeking
guidance regarding the ethical use of social media.
Because the disclosure obligations in the Code of Judicial Conduct
(Code) arise from the requirement that judges provide parties with information relevant to a "possible motion for disqualification,"20 Part II provides
necessary background on the disqualification standard and the application of
the disqualification standard to judges' social media connections. That section argues that because people generally understand that social media
"friendship" is less significant than traditional friendship, these connections
alone should not create the "appearance of impropriety" requiring disqualification. Part III describes the disclosure standard in general and then argues in
favor of a bright line rule requiring judges to disclose all relevant social media connections.

15.

Cooper, supra note 12, at 7-9.

16.

Id. at 9-11; see also N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Advisory Op.
13-39, 1 (2013) ("[T]he mere status of being a 'Facebook friend' without more
is an insufficient basis to require recusal .... Interpersonal relationships are

varied, fact-dependent, and unique to the individuals involved").
17.

Cooper, supra note 12, at 2.

18.

But see generally Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Disclosure and Disqualification: The Need For More Guidance, 28 JUST. Sys. J. no. 3 (2007) [hereinafter
Abramson, Judicial Disclosure].

19.

See Browning, supra note 14, at 507 (Others have written about the topic of
judges and social media in general but have not addressed the disclosure issue);
see also Nathanael J. Mitchell, Judge 2.0: A New Approach to Judicial Ethics
in the Age of Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 2127, 2133-36; Craig Estlinbaum, Social Networking and JudicialEthics, 2 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 1, 15-18 (2012).

20.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

R. 2.11 cmt. 5 (2011).
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DISQUALIFICATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA CONNECTIONS

Because the disclosure obligations in the Code arise from the requirement that judges provide parties with information relevant to a "possible motion for disqualification,"21 this Part discusses the disqualification standard
and whether judges' social media connections necessitate disqualification.
A.

Disqualification Under the Judicial Code

Rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that judges disqualify themselves "in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."22 This standard goes beyond cases of actual bias
and also prohibits judges from sitting in cases involving the appearance of
impropriety. A comment to the Code provides: "The test for appearance of
impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that
reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge."23 The words "reasonably" in the Code provision
and "reasonable" in the comments indicate that this is an objective
standard.24
This standard serves to give both the litigants and the public confidence
in the integrity of the courts.

21.
22.

23.
24.

25.

25

As one court put it: "[t]he legal system will

Id.
R. 2.11(A) (2011). The federal judicial
recusal statute is modeled on the Code and provides, in relevant part, that a
judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). Although I focus on
Rule 2.11(A), judges' social media connections also implicate at least two
other provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct: (1) MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) ("Judges must "act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.");
and (2) MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4(C) (2011) ("A judge shall
not convey or permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.").
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2011).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When A Judge's
Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55,
58 (2000) [hereinafter Abramson, Appearance] ("The use of the term 'reasonably' suggest that the viewpoint for assessing the presence of an appearance of
impropriety is not from the perspective of the judge whose continued control of
the case is at issue.").
Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L.
REV. 949, 951 (1996) ("The objective of the Code is to maintain both the reality of judicial integrity and the appearance of that reality.The public has confidence in judges who show character, impartiality, and diligence"); see also
Samuel Vincent Jones, Judges, Friends and Facebook: The Ethics of Prohibi-
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endure only so long as members of society continue to believe that our courts
endeavor to provide untainted, unbiased forums in which justice may be
found."26 Thus, "the appearance of fairness is as important as fairness
itself."27

B.

Applying the "Appearance of Impropriety" Standard to Judges'
Friendships

A judge's (non-social media) friendship with litigants, lawyers, or witnesses in pending matters certainly can create an "appearance of impropriety." Although friendship is not specifically listed as a basis for
disqualification in Rule 2.11, the rule's list of disqualifying circumstances is
non-exclusive.28 The comments to the Rule make this clear: "Under this Rule,
a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of
paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) apply."29 Moreover, courts have held that close
friendships can require disqualification.30 The specific concern is that the
personal relationship will cause "a reasonable person knowing all the circum-

tion, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281, 285 ("The purpose of the Judicial Code is
fueled by the imperative to maintain public confidence in the judiciary").
26.

Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 384 (W. Va.
1995); Sargent Cnty. Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 877-78 (N.D.
1993) (explaining that public confidence "can only be maintained if justice
satisfies the appearance of justice").

27.

Abramson, Appearance, supra note 24, at 66; Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R.
Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L. REv. 181, 181
(2011) ("The notion of an impartial trial under the direction of an unbiased
judge is a central tenet of our system of justiceFalse"); id. at 202 ("If the appearance-of-impropriety standard disregards public perception, the standard is
converted to one of requiring actual bias"); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 2 (2011) ("Conduct that compromises or appears to compro-

mise the independence, integrity and impartiality of a judge undermines public
confidence in the judiciary").
28.

R. 2.11(A) (2011) ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

might reasonably be questioned including but not limited to the following
circumstances.").

29.

Id. cmt. 1.

30.

United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 746 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding that trial
judge, who was close friends with a key defense witness, improperly failed to
disqualify himself under the federal disqualification statute); United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1540 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that trial judge who

was close friends with prosecuting attorney improperly failed to disqualify
himself).
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stances [to] believe that the judge will accord different credibility to the testimony or statements of the person known to the judge."31
Distinguishing which social relationships are impermissible under the
"appearance of impropriety" standard, however, is challenging, particularly
in the context of friendship; thus commentators have justifiably criticized the
standard.32 The Code does not define the level of friendship that would require a judge to recuse himself.33 Moreover, judges are certainly permittedif not encouraged-to maintain a social life and certainly do not have to, as
one court put it, "withdraw from society and live an ascetic, antiseptic and
socially sterile life."34 The Code itself accepts that judges may have a social
life by recognizing that judges who accept "ordinary social hospitality" do
not run afoul of the prohibition on receiving gifts.35
Of course, because of their shared interests and backgrounds, judges are
likely to have social relationships with lawyers. There is obviously nothing
wrong with such a relationship per se, but at some point that relationship
becomes so close that allowing the judge to sit in a case where his friend is
counsel creates an impermissible "appearance of impropriety" that requires
the judge to recuse himself.36 The courts and ethics authorities have struggled
to determine what constitutes permissible "ordinary social hospitality," versus an impermissible "appearance of impropriety."37

31.

Abramson, Appearance, supra note 24, at 96.

32.

Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a Per
Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 577 (2006)
(criticizing the "glaring gap in the law on the issue of when a judge must recuse
himself or herself because a party or advocate in the case is a friend").

33.
34.

Id. at 612 (defining friendship as "more than ordinary social intercourse").
United Farm Workers of Am. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 100 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985).

35.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

36.

R. 3.13(B)(3) (2011).

See Miller, supra note 32, at 578-79 (criticizing the lack of standard and suggesting the addition of a new standard: "Friendship between the judge and a
named party or attorney of record, that exceeds ordinary and reasonable social
intercourse between acquaintances and business associates mandates judicial
recusal.").
37. Abramson, Appearance, supra note 24, at 97 ("Social contact between a judge
and counsel for a party during the pendency of a case before the judge is discouraged. However, courts correctly refuse to promulgate per se rules that
'every chance meeting or a public social discussion between judge and lawyer[ ] requires judicial disqualification for the appearance of partiality. In order
to prove a negative appearance of partiality, evidence of the duration of the
encounter, the content of any conversation, the circumstances of the meeting,
and the frequency of meetings are necessary elements of proof."); see Miller,
supra note 32, at 595-607 (noting the paucity of precedent on the issue of
judicial recusal on the basis of friendship). The difficulty in applying this standard is reflected by the significant public debate that ensued after Justice
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Applying the "Appearance of Impropriety" Standard to Judges'
Social Media Connections

The next question is whether judges' social media connections with
lawyers and litigants who may appear before them create an "appearance of
impropriety" requiring disqualification.38 As set forth in this section, conflicting ethics opinions fail to provide clarity on whether a judge's social media
connections require disqualification.39 In my view, there is nothing inappropriate per se about such a connection,40 and a social media connection alone
should not require recusal.41
There is a split of authority on whether the Code allows social media
connections:42 some states take a "restrictive" view on the issue, while others
have issued "permissive" opinions.43 States, such as Florida, that adhere to a
restrictive view forbid a judge from friending lawyers who may appear
before the judge.44 The Florida Committee reasoned that when a judge

38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

Antonin Scalia went on a hunting trip with Vice President Dick Cheney while
Cheney was a defendant in a high profile case that was pending before the
Supreme Court. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004)
(Scalia, J.) (rejecting the recusal motion); Lawrence J. Fox, A.B.A., "I Did Not
Sleep with That Vice-President", 15 PROF. LAW. 15, no. 2 (2004) (arguing that
Justice Scalia should have recused himself).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2011).
See Cooper, supra note 12, at 31, 34.
See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Ethics Op. JE- 119 1, 5
(2010).
See, e.g., id. at 2 (A social media connection "by itself, does not reasonably
convey to others an impression that such person are in a special position to
influence the judge."); Cooper, supra note 12. In discussing social media
friendships, most of the ethics opinions issued to date do not specifically address disqualification. Rather, they discuss whether judges and lawyer can be
friends, usually discussing whether such friendships give the appearance that
the lawyer is in a special position to influence the judge in violation of MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4(C) (2011) ("A judge shall not convey or
permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a
position to influence the judge."). See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary,
Formal Ethics Op. JE- 119 1, 2 (2010). The specific rule that the ethics opinions
address is likely irrelevant: if it is inappropriate under the judicial code for a
judge to be friends with a lawyer because it "conveys the impression" that the
lawyer is "in a position to influence the judge" then the judge is likely subject
to disqualification.
See Browning, supra note 14, at 489.
Id.; see also Samuel Vincent Jones, supra note 25, at 287 (describing the two
views as "integrative" and "restrictive").
See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2009-20 (2009);
see also Browning, supra note 14, at 489 (describing this approach as the "restrictive approach").
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"friends" a lawyer, he is selecting a special class of accepted individuals
while rejecting others.45 That preference is then publicly communicated
through social networking, which conveys the impression that the lawyer is
in a special position to influence the judge.46 Thus, the Florida Committee
has consistently found that a social media friendship between a judge and a
lawyer violated the Code.47 Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Connecticut have
largely followed Florida's restrictive approach.48
On the other hand, states in the "permissive" camp-New York, Kentucky, South Carolina, Maryland, and Ohio-generally allow judges to be
friends with lawyers who may appear before them.49 For example, the Kentucky Ethics Committee concluded that a judge does not violate the Judicial
Code simply by connecting with a lawyer on social media.50 Similarly, the
New York Committee concluded that social network connections are allowed, but judges must consider whether the circumstances of each case
would indicate a "close social relationship" and require disclosure, recusal,
or both.51
The California Committee took a middle ground approach.52 The Committee did not answer whether there is a "per se prohibition on social
networking" but instead considered a variety of factors to determine whether
the connection created an appearance of impropriety.53 Although the committee used a permissive, fact-specific approach, it concluded that a judge cannot "interact with attorneys who have matters pending before the judge" and
that any such lawyers should be "unfriended."54
45.

Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2009-20 (2009).

46.

Id.

47.

See id.; see Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2010-6 (2010).

48.

Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011) (endorsing Florida
Opinion's view); Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Advisory Op. 2011-6 (2011)

("The Committee is of the opinion that the Code prohibits judges from associating in any way on social networking sites with attorneys who may appear
before them."); Conn. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. 2013-6 (2013)
("A Judicial Official should not become a social networking 'friend' of law
enforcement officials, social workers or any other persons who regularly appear in court in an adversarial role.").
49. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7
(2010).
50. Ethics Comm. of Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-1 19 at 2 (2010) (Social media
connection "by itself, does not reasonably convey to others an impression that
such person are in a special position to influence the judge.").
51. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009).
52. See Cal. Judges Ass'n Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 66 (2010).
53.

Id.

54.

Id.
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Finally, the ABA's recent opinion, like the California opinion, did not
clearly answer whether it is a violation per se for judges to connect on social
media with lawyers and litigants who may appear before them.55 Instead the
ABA mentioned that state committees "have expressed a wide range of
views" on the issue and noted that "designation as [a social media] connection does not, in and of itself, indicate the degree or intensity of a judge's
relationship with a person." The opinion concluded that "context is
significant."56
The problem is that the ABA's opinion, and most of the state ethics
opinions, do not provide judges with clear guidance on what social media
connections are permissible.57 Some of the ambivalence in the opinions undoubtedly reflects uncertainty about what it means to "friend" someone on
social media.58 For example, some users "friend" only friends they know in
the nonvirtual world, but other users "friend" anybody, even those they do
not know. As the Ohio Committee opinion artfully stated: "A rose is a rose is
a rose. A friend is a friend is a friend? Not necessarily. A social network
'friend' may or may not be a friend in the traditional sense of the word."59
With the confusion regarding the meaning of friendship on social media, a
"digitally enlightened or realist approach" could provide needed guidance to
judges.60
A better approach would be to provide two bright-line rules. First,
judges should be able to connect with anyone on social media, even lawyers
who may appear before them. Social media connections sometimes mean
very little, because being "friends" with somebody on social media is much
different from our traditional notions of friendship.61 As such, social media
connections sometimes mean very little and do not, by themselves, create an
"appearance of impropriety."62 That being said, a second bright line rule is
appropriate in these circumstances: as set forth below, if judges are connected with lawyers, litigants, or witnesses in the case, those "friendships"
should be fully disclosed to the parties.
55.

See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 426, at 2

(2013).
56.

Id.

57.

See Mitchell, supra note 19, at 2137; see also Estlinbaum, supra note 19, at 6
(criticizing the extant opinions for "provid[ing] no clear guidance or
consensus").

58.

See Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 210-7 (2010).

59.

Id.

60.

Browning, supra note 14, at 490.

61.

Id. at 495.

62.

See id.

SMU Science and Technology Law Review
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JUDGES' DUTY TO DISCLOSE SOCIAL MEDIA CONNECTIONS

This Part first discusses the disclosure obligations imposed by the Code
of Judicial Conduct before turning to the application of that standard to
judges' social media connections. After reviewing the limited authority addressing the issue, I propose a broad disclosure regime that would serve two
primary purposes: (1) maintaining the litigants' and the public's confidence
in the judiciary; and (2) providing much needed clarity to judges who have
been asking for guidance about how to use social media ethically.
A.

Judges' Disclosure Obligations Under the Code of Judicial
Conduct

The Code requires that a "judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no basis for disqualification."63 In other words even if the
judge himself does not believe that the relationship is significant enough to
create an "appearance of impropriety, the judge must disclose a social relationship-including a social media connection-if reasonable people might
disagree.64
Like the disqualification standard, the disclosure standard is objective.65
It focuses on what a reasonable person might consider relevant to disqualification,66 a notable shift from the prior version of the Code, which did not
include the word "reasonably."67 The new standard "appears to change the
reference point for judicial disclosure. Formerly, the judge ought to have
disclosed information that the judge believed the actual parties and counsel
might think to be relevant. The new language allows the judge to bypass the
personal qualities of the parties and focuses the judge's belief about disclosure on information that the reasonable person would consider pertinent to a
disqualification motion."68

R. 2.11 cmt. 5 (2011).

63.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

64.

Id. A judge might also disclose social media connections when he is seeking a
waiver of a disqualifying conflict under Rule 2.11 (C), which states that a judge
"[s]ubject to disqualification ...may disclose on the record the basis of the
judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider
whether to waive the disqualification."
...

65.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011) (holding disqualification

to a reasonable standard).
66.

Id. R. 2.11 cmt. 5.

67.

Compare id. (2011) ("might reasonably consider relevant"), with id. (2007)
("might consider relevant").

68.

Abramson, Judicial Disclosure, supra note 18, at 305-06.
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Very little has been written about the meaning and application of the
disclosure standard.69 The language of the disclosure requirement makes
clear that it is broader than the disqualification requirement, and the limited
authorities construing the disclosure requirement have reached the same conclusion. As noted, the text of the comment requires disclosure "even if the
judge believes there is no basis for disqualification."7 0 As one court put it,
this comment "reveals a separate obligation to disclose that is broader than
the duty to disqualify.'
B.

Limited Authority Addressing Judges' Duty to Disclose Social
Media Connections

Commentators have largely failed to address judges' obligations to disclose social media,72 and only a few ethics opinions speak to the issue. Those
opinions are split on whether judges should disclose online friendships as
part of their obligation to "disclose on the record information that the judge
might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification,
even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification."73
The New York, Kentucky, and ABA ethics opinions all concluded that
judges should decide whether to disclose online friendships on a case-bycase basis. 74 The ABA Opinion, for example, said that a "judge should conduct the same analysis [of a social media connection] that must be made
whenever matters before the court involve persons the judge knows or has a
connection with professionally or personally." It then advised that judges

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

A notable exception is Leslie W. Abramson. See, e.g., Abramson, JudicialDisclosure, supra note 18.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 5 (2011).
In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 711; (Ind. 1998); see also In re Frank, 753 So.
2d 1228, 1239 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that a judge should disclose information
in circumstances even where disqualification may not be required, because the
"standard for disclosure is lower."); O'Neill v. Thibodeaux, 709 So.2d 962,
967-68 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that trial judge correctly disclosed that he
occasionally played cards with one of the parties, even though the judge was
not required to disqualify himself from presiding over the case on that basis);
Collier v. Griffith, 1992 WL 44893 at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 1992)
(basing the broader duty on "the seminal importance of impartiality"); Leslie
W. Abramson, The Judge's Relative Is Affiliated with Counsel of Record: The
Ethical Dilemma, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1181, 1188 (2004) [hereinafter Abramson, Ethical Dilemma] (noting the consensus that the duty to disclose is broader
than the duty to disqualify).
See generally, Browning supra note 14 (offering thoughtful insight on the
issue).
Cooper, supra note 12, at 31-32.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof IResponsibility, Formal Op. 426 (2013); Ethics
Comm. of Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119 (2010); N.Y. State Advisory
Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Opinion 08-176 (2009).
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should "very carefully consider whether [social media] connections must be
disclosed" if the judge and the lawyer engage in "current and frequent communication."75 But the Opinion went on to say that the judge need not review
all social media connections "if a judge does not have specific knowledge of
an electronic social media [ESM] connection" that may potentially or actually be problematic."76 In those circumstances, the judge should consider a
number of factors: the number of friends that a judge has, whether the judge
has a practice of accepting all friend requests, and other factors . . . ."77 The
ABA Opinion concludes, however, that "because of the open and casual nature of ESM communication, a judge will seldom have an affirmative duty to
disclose an ESM connection."78
The problem with the ABA's case-by-case approach is that it fails to
provide clear guidance to judges.79 Further, it fails to support the Code's
policy behind the disqualification and disclosure rules: maintaining the public's confidence in the judiciary.80 For example, a judge applying the ABA's
case-by-case approach might conclude that he does not have to disclose his
social media connection with the prosecutor in the case, but that does not
change how the criminal defendant in the case (or his lawyer or a member of
the public) who discovers the "friendship" might feel about the connection.
Indeed, the failure to disclose might make the criminal defendant and his
lawyer even more suspicious. Relatedly, without a broader disclosure rule,
litigants and the public will be left to wonder whether judges who are on
social media are hiding connections behind privacy settings.
The California Committee, on the other hand, opined that judges should
disclose all online friendships.81 The Committee found that the nature of online social networking creates the need for more disclosure.82 As the Committee noted, while the connection is publicly known, the nature of the
"friendship" is not. Therefore, the Committee supported broad disclosure to
"dispel any concerns that the attorney is in a special position to influence the
judge or that the judge would not be impartial."83

75.

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 426 (2013).

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Cooper, supra note 12, at 32.

80.

Id.

81.

Cal. Judges Ass'n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 66 (2010).

82.

ld.

83.

Id.
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Arguments in Favor of a Broad Disclosure Standard

Ethics committees should draw a bright-line rule as the California committee did: judges should be forced to disclose to the litigants any relevant
social media connections (i.e., "friendships" with lawyers, parties, or witnesses).84 A bright-line rule like California's would serve two principal goals.
First, a broad disclosure rule would help maintain the litigants' and the public's confidence in the judiciary by ensuring that everybody shares the same
information concerning social media connections. Second, it would provide
much needed clarity to a judiciary that has been asking for clear rules.
i.

Disclosure as Disinfectant

Justice Louis Brandeis famously said that "Sunlight is ...the best of
disinfectants,"85 and although he said it many years before the invention of
Facebook, his concept applies to judicial disclosure of social media connections. Broad disclosure serves the critical policy behind the disqualification
and disclosure rules: enhancing the litigants' and the public's confidence in
the judicial system.8 6 As the California Judicial Conduct Handbook states:
"Nothing provides stronger evidence to the parties of [judicial] impartiality
than open disclosure."87 Open disclosure "advances the integrity of the judiciary and the public's trust in the judge."8s
Broad disclosure is an especially good idea in the particular context of
social media because it requires the application of an ambiguous standard to
ambiguous conduct. First, the disqualification standard that drives the need
for disclosure is vague. As discussed in Part II, this "appearance of impropriety" standard is difficult to apply and requires a careful analysis of all the
facts in order to determine which relationships are permissible "ordinary social hospitality" as opposed to those that rise to the level of an impermissible
"appearance of impropriety."89 Courts have had a difficult time applying this
standard to social relationships.90
Second, the disclosure standard, which provides that a "judge should
disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their
lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disquali-

84.

Id.

85.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY,

http://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/

bio.html (last visited May 7, 2015).
86.

See supra note 26 and surrounding text.

87.

Merck & Co. v. Superior Court, No. B180613, 2005 WL880112, n.5 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2005).

88.

Abramson, Ethical Dilemma, supra note 73, at 1188.

89.

See Abramson, Appearance, supra note 24, at 97; see also United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1538 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that "social relations take
so many forms it would be imprudent to gauge all by a single test").

90.

See Miller, supra note 32, at 577.
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fication, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification,"91 is
also ambiguous. The use of the terms "might" and "reasonably" in the standard create significant uncertainty. Moreover, several ethics opinions have
correctly concluded that social media connections are significant, even
though they are not disqualifying by themselves. They are one piece of information that parties need to have in order to determine whether to move to
disqualify the judge.92
Relatedly, the fact that both the disqualification standard and the disclosure standard are objective creates ambiguity. The judge's own subjective
belief about the relevance of the information is irrelevant. Instead, the judge
needs to focus on what the parties and lawyer "would consider pertinent to a
disqualification motion."93 The standard requires the judge to disclose information that a reasonable person might find relevant to disqualification even if
the judge does not believe that the information is relevant.
To this point, my argument in favor of a robust disclosure standard has
focused on the vagueness of the standard itself and could serve as an argument for broader disclosure of all information. The argument in favor of
broad disclosure is even stronger, however, when it comes to social media:
the unique attributes of social media create yet another layer of ambiguity.
Specifically, the social meaning of social media connections remains uncertain. For example, when a Facebook user posts a news article about a violent
earthquake or an obituary of somebody who has died, what does it mean
when the user's friends "like" the post? Presumably, it does not mean that the
user's friends are happy about the earthquake or death. Facebook tells us that
"[w]hen you click Like on a Facebook Page, in an advertisement, or on content off of Facebook, you are making a connection."94 Of course, what
Facebook tells us is largely meaningless because users are free to "like"

91.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 5 (2011).

92.

See N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Advisory Op. 13-39, at 1
(2013) (concluding that "the mere status of being a 'Facebook friend' without
more is an insufficient basis to require recusalFalse Interpersonal relationships
are varied, fact-dependent, and unique to the individuals involved."); see also
Ky. Formal Judicial Ethics Op. JE-1 19, at 2 (2010) (concluding that "not every
one of these relationships necessitates a judge's recusal from a case."); Md.
Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 2012-07, at 5 (2012) (concluding that "the mere
existence of a friendship between a judge and an attorney does not, in and of
itself, disqualify the judge from cases involving that attorney ....The Com-

mittee sees no reason to view or treat 'Facebook friends' differently.").
93.

Abramson, Judicial Disclosure, supra note 18, at 305.

94.

See What Does it Mean to Like a Page or Content Off of Facebook?,

https://www.facebook.com/help/131263873618748 (last visited May 7, 2015).
FACEBOOK.COM,
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things for any reason at all.95 At a minimum, it is safe to say that "liking"
something on Facebook is different than "liking" something offline and that
there is not yet universal agreement about its social meaning.
Similarly, the meaning of social media "friendship" is ambiguous.96 In
some cases, users become social media "friends" with people whom they
would describe as friends in the non-virtual world, but in other cases, social
media "friends" would not even qualify as real world acquaintances.97 Some
people are picky about whom they will "friend" on social media, but others,
like Judge Placey, will friend anybody, even people whom they have never
met. This makes it difficult to ascribe meaning to social media.
Trying to apply a vague standard to ambiguous conduct creates uncertainty. Broad disclosure eliminates the likelihood that a party, or a lawyer,
will later learn about [a social media] affiliation and conclude that the judge
improperly failed to disqualify sue sponte. 98 In other words, disclosure
"avoids any hint that the judge concealed important information from
them."99 Ultimately, the goal is to reduce the "appearance of impropriety,"
and a broad disclosure rule best serves that goal.
Finally, a transparent approach putting everybody on a level playing
field will also reduce shenanigans intended to evade regulation. Take, for
example, judges who have social media connections with lawyers, tell those
lawyers to "de-friend" them when they appear before the judge, and then
reconnect after the case is over. 00
ii.

The Advantages of a Clear Rule

The other major advantage of the disclosure rule that I propose is that it
provides clarity. Specifically, a "bright-line rule serves people notice of the

95.

Ira P. Robbins, What is the Meaning of "Like"? The First Amendment Implications of Social-Media Expression, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 127 (2013) (arguing that
clicking "like" on Facebook is First Amendment protected speech).

96.

Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First
Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1606 (2012) ("Although most social media
connections reflect pre-existing offline connections, social media also brings
together strangers with similar hobbies, interests, and political views.").

97.

Ohio Bd. of Commr's on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2010-7, at 1 (2010) ("A
rose is a rose is a rose. A friend is a friend is a friend? Not necessarily. A
social network 'friend' may or may not be a friend in the traditional sense of
the word.").

98.

Browning, supra note 14.

99.

Abramson, Ethical Dilemma, supra note 73, at 1189.

100. Dahlia Lithwick & Graham Vyse, Tweet Justice, SLATE, Apr. 30, 2010, http://
www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2010/04/tweet_
justice.html.
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standards to which their conduct is expected to conform."OI Providing standards so that people know how to behave is usually a good thing, but it is
particularly important in this context. First, judges themselves have requested
more guidance on recusal issues.102 Judges desire greater guidance so they
can use social media and still comply with ethical obligations under the
Code.103 Currently, judges in California are the only ones with clear guidance
on the disclosure of social media connections, while judges in the rest of the
country are left without any clear direction.
iii. Anticipating the Objections
One of the primary arguments against a broad disclosure rule is that it
may deter judges from using social media at all because of the hassle of
making disclosures which may invite disqualification motions. But the current regime in most states-where judges don't know whether they can
friend lawyers, and, if they do, whether they have to disclose those connections-already has a chilling effect on judges' social media activity, to the
extent that judges lack clear guidance and therefore may be discouraged from
participating.
Moreover, the open disclosure regime that I advocate is preferable to the
two primary alternatives (aside from the status quo). First, judges could be
banned from social media altogether. Although some judges decide of their
own accord not to participate in social media, all of the ethics opinions have
recognized the value of social media to judges. As the ABA opinion recognized, judges should not become "isolated" from the community in which
they live, and social media "has become an everyday part of worldwide culture."104 Further, "[J]udicious use of [social media] can benefit judges in both
their personal and professional lives" and also keep them from being
"thought of as isolated or out of touch."05 As one commentator wrote,
101. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward A Jurisprudenceof Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 907, 908 (1992); see also Florrie Young Roberts, "Off-Site Conditions
and Disclosure Duties: Drawing The Line At The PropertyLine, 2006 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 957, 982 ("One major benefit of rules that are certain is that their

clarity results in predictability. People will know in advance what the law expects of them and can model their behavior in accordance with the rule.").
102. Jona Goldschmidt & Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Disqualification: What Do
Judges Think?, 80 JUDICATURE 2, at 68-72.
103.

See CONFERENCE OF COURT PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS, CCPIO NEW ME-

DIA SURVEY (2013), at i.

104. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, at 1 (2013).
105. Id.; see also S.C. Bar, Advisory Op. 17-2009, at 1 (2009) (concluding that
"complete separation of a judge from extra-judicial activities is neither possible
nor wise; a judge should not become isolated from the community in which the

judge lives"); N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Advisory Op. 08176, at 1 (2009) (concluding that "the Committee cannot discern anything inherently inappropriate about a judge joining and making use of a social net-
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"While judges should proceed with caution when using social networking
platforms-as they should with any communication platform-they should
still proceed."06
Second, we could allow judges to have social media connections with
attorneys but require them to keep their "friends" private, thereby avoiding,
in theory, an improper appearance. There are at least two problems with this
solution. First, it would "require judges to master their privacy settings and to
be vigilant for changes made by Facebook and other social networking sites
to their privacy policies ... ."107 Moreover, attorneys who have social media
connections with judges would also need to keep their "friends" private in
order to keep that information from being publicly available. 108 Second, and
more importantly, this solution will not fulfill the goal of maintaining the
public's confidence in the integrity of the legal system and the impartiality of
the judiciary. One commentator opined that:
If anything, such a policy is only likely to erode public confidence
and generate distrust of both the process and the outcome of a
particular proceeding. It is a fact of life that relationships exist
between judges and lawyers that are not public knowledge, such
as golfing, hunting, or other social relationships, but it is another
thing entirely to have a policy or mandate to keep these relationships hidden.109
Another potential objection is that in most instances, judges decide their
own recusal motions, 1o so requiring disclosure is useless because the judge
has already considered the social media connection (and other potential disqualifying information) and determined that recusal is not necessary. The
primary problem with this argument is that the Code explicitly requires disclosure of potentially disqualifying information "even if the judge believes

work. A judge generally may socialize in person with attorneys who appear in
the judge's court, subject to the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct"); John
Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2009, at A25 (quoting Professor Stephen Gillers, "Judges do not 'drop out
of society when they become judge .... The people who were their friends
before they went on the bench remained their friends, and many of them were
lawyers.'").
106. Browning, supra note 14, at 533.
107. Id. at 529.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 543 (1994) ("In the majority of states, the decision of whether
to grant or deny a motion to recuse is within the sound discretion of the challenged judge.").
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there is no basis for disqualification,"]lI and there are good reasons for this
requirement. First, if a party decides to bring a motion for disqualification,
the judge may ultimately be swayed by arguments and authority that he initially failed to consider; parties should have the opportunity to present those
arguments to the judge. Parties will only have a full and fair opportunity to
do so if they are given the relevant facts. Although social media connections
alone should not be sufficient to disqualify a judge12 they are one piece of
the puzzle. Further, most judges' disqualification decisions are subject to appellate review, and lawyers should have the opportunity to build an appellate
record.
Admittedly, this disclosure proposal will put a burden on judges. First,
in order to comply, they will need to keep careful track of their social media
connections. They could assign a staff member to do this or, if that is impractical, they could use a standing order to put a burden on the lawyers who
appear before them to identify relevant social media connections. In addition,
disclosure of social media connections may increase the number of disqualification motions, but that is a small price to pay for the benefits of broad
disclosure. Moreover, although greater disclosure could produce more disqualification motions, there remains a significant deterrent to such motions:
lawyers still fear making the judge mad.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although they lag behind the general population, an increasing number
of judges are using social media.l"3 Yet judges report that they are concerned
about whether they may do so without running afoul of judicial ethics
codes.1l4 This article has argued in favor of providing judges with clear guidance concerning their social media use. Judges should be able to friend anybody who they choose if they disclose all social media connections with
lawyers, litigants, and witnesses in pending matters.
How would Judge Placey and Judge Hayden have fared under such a
regime? Both were "friends" with defendants in the case but apparently had
no further connection with them."15 There is nothing inherently wrong with
their participation in social media or being "friends" with the defendants, but
both should have disclosed that connection. Judge Placey ultimately recused
himself without providing any explanation, while the appellate court ordered
Judge Hayden off the case. Their social media connections alone should not
have led to their disqualification, and the court in Judge Hayden's case erred
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in reaching that conclusion. The strongest argument in favor of their disqualification is that the failure to disclose the social media connection itself arguably created an appearance of impropriety. Under the broad disclosure regime,
however, disclosure would give the parties and the public confidence in the
integrity of the judges, and the judges would have been able to continue
serving in those cases.

